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We analyze a model that focuses on the export/outsource decision. Outsourcing has the 
advantage of providing better information about local preferences. The disadvantage is that 
producing in the host country also means using the inferior technology embodied in the local 
capital. The decision of whether to offer an outsourcing contract weighs these two effects 
against each other. The host country accepts the outsourcing contract if the higher price they 
pay for the outsourced good is worth the benefit of consuming a manufactured good closer to 
their ideal variety. These results suggest that as low income countries develop they become a 
more attractive destination for outsourcing because the quality of their capital improves and 
the local market is more lucrative. In addition, the developing low income country finds the 
outsourcing contract more attractive since their increased demand for the correct variety of the 
manufactured good increases. This suggests that preference based outsourcing is more likely 
to occur with higher income host countries. 
JEL Code: F20, F21, F23. 
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grateful for comments and suggestions by Eric Bond, Ronald Jones, and participants of the 
Midwest International Trade Meeting and the Kobe Conference in memory of Koji 
Shimomura. 1 Introduction
The study of the causes and consequences of outsourcing of production by ￿rms has received
increasing attention since the turn of the century (e.g., Jones, 2000, Grossman and Helpman, 2002
and 2004, and Antras 2004). This literature focuses primarily on the outsourcing decision based
on the theory of the ￿rm, regarding the make-or-buy outcome as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Our paper develops a preference-based theory of outsourcing in which outsourcing is bene￿cial
because it mitigates the information problem with respect to the identi￿cation of local tastes for
the manufactured good ￿that is, the local economy is engaged in ￿design for manufacturing￿to
suit local preferences.
We consider a simple, dynamic framework with the following speci￿c features.
￿ There are two countries, a low-income developing local country and a high-income developed
source country.
￿ There are two types of goods, a homogeneous good (food, for example) produced only in the
local country and a particular variety of a manufactured good (laptop computer, for example)
that may be produced in the source or the local country.
￿ Only the source country does R&D to improve the production technology of the manufactured
good.
￿ The source country may outsource production of the manufactured good to the local economy.
￿ Only through outsourcing can the source country ￿rm correctly identify the local economy￿ s
variety-speci￿c preferences.
￿ Each country employs a speci￿c factor. The source country utilizes general capital for pro-
duction and technology advancement, whereas the local country uses physical capital for
production only.
￿ The manufacturers in the source country maximize its value by choosing (i) whether to
outsource the production of their good and (ii) the allocation of capital between production
and research.
￿ In the local country, an integrated representative consumer-producer decides (i) whether to
accept the outsourcer￿ s contract (if o⁄ered) and (ii) how to allocate consumption and capital
1intertemporally (and intersectorally if an outsourcing contract is o⁄ered and accepted).
We assume initially the source country exports the manufactured good to the local country,
referred to as the export regime. We then identify under what circumstances the equilibrium
switches from the status quo to the outsourcing regime. We show that with a su¢ ciently high
initial capital stock, the preference of residents in the local country for the manufactured good
grows over time to a level that is su¢ ciently high to shift preferences away from the necessity
toward the manufactured good. Such shifts enhance the importance of variety-speci￿c preferences.
As a result, the local country agents ￿nd the better matched, outsourced manufactured good more
desirable and are more willing to pay for it. The larger price markup over the non-ideal product
makes outsourcing more pro￿table. Thus, our model features ￿cross-country complementarity￿
that triggers the outsourcing equilibrium when local country income is su¢ ciently high.
It is possible that outsourcing may never arise. In particular, this can happen if local country
income is su¢ ciently low, capital is scarce, the discount rate high, and its consumers spend a major
portion of their income on the necessity. In this case, consumers there care less about the variety
of the manufactured good and hence have lower demand. This lower demand drives down the price
mark up for outsourced goods thereby giving the source country less incentive to outsource. Hence,
for very low income countries the export regime be the steady state.
2 The Basic Model
We begin with a very simple model. There are two countries (local and source), two production
inputs (general capital and land), and two goods N (necessity) and M (manufactured good.)
There are J varieties j 2 f1;2;:::;Jg , J > 2 of the manufactured good. Denote the jth variety
as Mj. General capital can be thought of as a composite stock of human, physical and knowledge
capital. The necessity is produced in the local country using both local capital and land. However,
the manufactured good requires the input of the source country￿ s research capital. Hence, by
assumption the manufactured good can only be produced in the local country if it is outsourced.1
We focus on two sets of decisions. In the source country, the manufacturer decides (i) whether
to export good Mj or whether to outsource the production of good Mj and (ii) how to allocate
capital to production and research. In the local country, an integrated representative consumer-
1We are ruling out the possibility that the local manufacturer can purchase the research capital from the source
country. For a paper that looks at this issue see Spulber (2007).
2producer decides (i) whether to accept the outsourcing contract (if o⁄ered) and (ii) how to allocate
consumption and capital intertemporally (and intersectorally if an outsourcing contract is o⁄ered
and accepted).
2.1 Source Country
The source country owns the ￿high quality￿general capital that can be used for either manufac-
turing or research. Though the allocation of this capital is essential, its accumulation is not the
focus of this paper but rather the accumulation of knowledge for production technology is the key.
Thus, denoting this capital stock at the beginning of time t as Ht, we assume for simplicity that
there is no depreciation or accumulation.
The aggregate general capital stock at the beginning of time t is divided into manufacturing
capital (HM





and the stock of capital remains constant over time:
Ht = H0 = 1 8t = 1;2;::: (2)
It is convenient to denote st =
HR
t
Ht as the share of research capital, which under (2) also represents
the stock of research-use capital.
In addition to research capital we assume that source country ￿rms can invest in R&D directly.
The timing of decisions is as follows. At the beginning of period t, the existing capital stock Ht = 1
is is divided into research uses (st) and manufacturing uses (1 ￿ st). Next, production of the
manufactured good occurs based on the current technology (A
j
t). Then the R&D investment (zt) is
implemented, which is added to the research-use capital (st) to determine next periods production
technology (A
j




By assuming for simplicity that the R&D investment and the research-use capital are perfect
substitutes, the evolution of manufacturing technology is then governed by:
A
j

















where   > 0 is a technology advancement scaling factor and ￿ 2 (0;1).
32.1.1 Exporting the Manufactured good
Now consider the case in which the source country exports. We assume that the source country
does not know the ideal variety of the manufactured good desired by the local country (call this
variety i). So, we assume the exporter chooses some variety j 6= i. Manufacturing capital enters
the production of M
j
t immediately, but research capital only enhances future production of M
j
t+1.
Assume that the technologies of producing any varieties require identical resources, i.e., there
are only horizontal di⁄erentiation among di⁄erent varieties. The production of a manufacturing












t (1 ￿ st)
￿ (4)
where ￿ 2 (0;1).
Given a constant discount rate r, the Bellman equation facing the representative ￿rm in the
source country producing and exporting the manufactured good to the local country (denoted by

































That is, the source ￿rm￿ s value is equal to its current pro￿t (revenue from producing and exporting
the manufactured good, net of the R&D investment cost) plus its discounted future value.











































￿￿ = qt (7)
which equate the marginal bene￿t of each of the two choice variables with the marginal cost. The




































With production outsourcing, the source country still maintains full control of the technology.
Since it does not produce the manufactured good it uses all of the general capital Ht for research
4purposes. The local country￿ s subcontracting ￿rm determines the employment of the local capital
KM
t to manufacture the contracted good. The advantage of outsourcing is that involvement of the
local country enables an exact identi￿cation of the local ideal variety i.
It is necessary to modify the production of a manufacturing product of the ideal variety i and
























Assume that the outsourcing contract is one featuring revenue-sharing. More speci￿cally, the value
of the contracted manufacturing output is so divided that a fraction ￿ goes to the local country
with the remaining fraction to the source country.






























Compared to the exporting regime, the production technology under the outsourcing regime is
unambiguously higher due to complete specialization by devoting the entirety of the general capital
to research (s = 1). Yet, the associated pro￿t can be higher (as a result of using a better technology)
or lower (if the local country￿ s supply of capital is scarce or if the cost of revenue-sharing outweighs
the technology gain).











































We assume that capital in the less developed local economy is of ￿low quality￿in the sense that it
can only be used for manufacturing purposes. So, without research capital or spending on R&D
(which we rule out) A
j
t = 0 and the manufactured good cannot be produced by the local company
without help from the source country. Denote the aggregate capital stock in the local country at
5the beginning of time t as Kt. Then, capital may be devoted to production of the necessity or




The entire stock depreciates at a rate ￿ 2 (0;1) and is augmented by gross investment vt, thus
evolving according to:
Kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)Kt + vt (15)
This evolution process is modeled explicitly because it is the only force of growth to the local
economy in transition to the steady state.







where ￿ 2 (0;1). The output of the necessity will be partly consumed by the local economy (call
this fraction ￿) and partly exported to the world market (fraction 1 ￿ ￿) at ￿xed price one.
Denote the subjective time discount rate as ￿ > 0. The periodic utility of the representative
consumer-producer (of a given ideal taste type i) purchasing manufactured goods of variety j is
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t measures the local demand for the necessity, ￿ > 0 indicates that the manufactured
good is not a necessity, and ￿j ￿ 1 captures preference bias toward the ideal variety. Assume





dj, where dj denotes the minimum distance between the purchased variety j and
the ideal variety i, [￿] is the Gauss operator, and ￿0 2 (0;1). Obviously, when the purchased variety
j is the ideal variety i (which occurs only when the manufactured good is outsourced), we have
￿i = 1. Otherwise, there is ￿variety-speci￿c preference discounting￿at a factor ￿j < 1 (j 6= i). The
larger ￿0 or dj , the greater the variety-speci￿c preference discount.
Let Yt denote the periodic income in units of the necessity good (to be speci￿ed later). The






t + vt = Yt
which together with (15) implies,






62.2.1 Importing the manufactured good
When the manufactured good is produced in the source country, the optimization problem facing the
local country￿ s representative agent is simple: maximize lifetime utility by allocating intertempo-
rally available resources to consumption of one (the necessity) or both goods and capital investment.
In this case, the variety j of the manufactured good provided to the local economy is given in the
absence of outsourcing. Thus, we have: KN
t = Kt, KM
t = 0, and Yt = (Kt)
￿.
Given the discount rate ￿ > 0, the Bellman equation facing the representative agent in the case
where the manufactured good is produced in the source country and exported is given by,
















V EX (Kt+1) (19)
s.t. Kt+1 = (Kt)






The ￿rst-order conditions for Nd
t and M
j























Given ￿ > 0, the lower the variety-speci￿c preference discounting (higher ￿j), the greater the
marginal utility of consuming the manufactured good (the LHS of (21)). Should the luxurious
nature of the manufactured good disappear (￿ = 0), the variety-speci￿c preference discounting will
no longer in￿ uence the consumption behavior.










￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
i
(22)
2.2.2 Producing the outsourced manufactured good
When the manufactured good is produced in the local economy via outsourcing, the optimization
problem facing the local country￿ s representative agent has to include the allocation of capital
between the two sectors (provided that accepting the outsourcing contract is pro￿table). With the
local economy￿ s involvement, it is assumed that the ideal variety i of the manufactured good can
be identi￿ed. In this case, KM
t = Kt ￿ KN
























7That is, real income accrued to the local country now depends on two sources, both from producing
the necessity and from revenue sharing by producing the manufactured good.
The Bellman equation facing the representative agent in this outsourcing case now becomes:
































































We note that the ￿rst-order condition with respect to Mi
t (26) di⁄ers from (21) under the exporting
regime because there is no variety-speci￿c preference discounting under outsourcing. Also in con-
trast with the previous case, there is an additional ￿rst order condition (27) that governs optimal
capital allocation between the two sectors.




















We next turn to the determination of equilibrium. Consider the following timing of events:
1. The source country determines whether to outsource production of the manufactured good
to the local country with a revenue-sharing contract that rewards local country a fraction ￿
of the surplus accrued.
2. The local country decides whether to accept this outsourcing contract, if o⁄ered.
3. Under the exporting or the outsourcing regime, the source country and the local country



































where ￿t is the share of Nt that is consumed in the local country.2
Next, we solve for the equilibrium. To satisfy subgame perfection, we solve the problem back-
ward. Before solving the model, however, it is useful to provide a brief comparison between the
two market prices of the manufactured goods in units of the necessity. From (29) and (30), there
are four channels through which the two manufactured good prices may di⁄er:
pj vs. pi
(1) ￿j < 1 <
(2) KN < K >
(3) Aj < Ai >
(4) HM vs. KM ?
The ￿rst channel is through variety-speci￿c preference bias. Since the imported manufactured good
is less preferred than the locally produced one (under the outsourcing regime) there is less demand
and a lower market price, thus ￿j < 1 implies pj < pi. Second, by importing the manufactured
good, the local economy can focus exclusively on producing the necessity and greater supply of
the necessity leads to a higher relative price of the manufactured good. Third, by exporting
the manufactured good, the source country￿ s economy must allocate a portion of capital to its￿
production. Thus, less capital is allocated to research leading to a slower rate of technological
advancement. This in turns lowers the productivity and hence the supply of manufactured good,
leading to a higher relative price of the exported manufactured good. Finally, the supply of the
manufactured good also depends on the factor input: HM = 1￿s versus KM = K ￿KN. Even by
assuming that the more advanced source country is capital abundant, it is not clear its production-
use capital is larger than the counterpart in the less developed local country. Thus, the e⁄ect on
the market prices is ambiguous.
In summary, while variety-speci￿c preference bias tends to make the relative price of the man-
ufactured good under the exporting regime lower than under the outsourcing regime, outsourcing-
driven production specialization both in the local economy (KN < K) and in the source country
2It follows that (1 ￿ ￿t) of the necessity good will be exported by the local country.
9(Aj < Ai) leads to the opposite outcome. Thus, even without accounting for relative capital abun-
dance (HM vs. KM), the o⁄setting demand and supply forces yields inconclusive results regarding
the relative price of the manufactured good under the two regimes. We now proceed to solving for
the equilibrium.
3.1 Stage 3
We will ￿rst derive the steady-state solutions in each of the two regimes: exporting and outsourcing.
3.1.1 The Exporting Regime
Under the exporting regime,we can manipulate the ￿rst-order conditions and the Benveniste-
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t￿1)1￿￿ (st + zt)
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(1 ￿ ￿)  (1 ￿ st￿1)
























￿￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)
i
(34)
Imposing the steady state, (31), (32) and (34) become:




(1 ￿ s) (35)
(1 + r)￿(Aj)1￿￿ (s + z)
￿ =   [(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ s) + ￿￿(s + z)] (36)
￿ (K)
￿￿1 = ￿ + ￿ (37)
The expression in (37) is the standard modi￿ed golden rule in discrete-time neoclassical growth





1￿￿ : From (15) and (18), v = ￿K and pjMj + ￿K = (1 ￿ ￿)Y . This latter relationship,
together with the production functions, (4) and (16), implies: pjAj (1 ￿ s)




which can be further combined with (35) to yield:
q
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(1 ￿ s) =
￿
K














(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
￿
K (39)
That is, a higher export share of the necessity in the local economy (1￿￿) makes the local economy
richer and demand higher for the manufactured good, which in turn encourages the source country
to allocate general capital to production (1￿s). In other words, the share of production-use general
capital in the source country and the export share of the necessity in the local country are positively
related. This relationship is referred to as the exportable production (XP) locus; see the bottom
panel of Figure 1.
Figure 1: Allocation and Pricing in the Exporting Regime (EX)
From (3), Aj =  
1
1￿￿ (s + z), which can be substituted into (36) to derive ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + r)(s+z) =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ s), or,
z =
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ [(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + r)]s
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + r)
(40)




1￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + r)
(1 ￿ s) (41)
Intuitively, more allocation of general capital to R&D substitutes for R&D investment. Because an

























q1+￿ > 0. This gives a positive relationship between the relative price of
the necessity ( 1
pj) and the the export share of the necessity. This relationship is based on the
budget constraint and the intertemporal trade-o⁄ between current production and technological
advancement. We therefore refer to it as the intertemporal trade locus (IT). It is straightforward




























￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
i (43)
This gives another positive relationship between the relative price of the necessity and the export
share of the necessity. This relationship follows from the budget constraint and the marginal rate
of substitution conditions. We can think of this as the balance of payments condition and is hence


















Intuitively, the BP locus may simply be viewed as the local country￿ s supply curve of the
necessity embedded with optimal consumption allocation and trade balance conditions. Thus, it
is not surprising that the BP locus slopes upward. The IT locus is somewhat harder to explain.
Precisely, it is a combination of the intertemporal consumption-capital choice by the local country
and the intratemporal capital allocation and R&D investment by the source country. Thus, the IT
locus does not represent the source country￿ s demand for the necessity and need not be downward-
sloping.
Under some regularity conditions, the IT and the BP loci intersect twice, yielding two steady-
state solutions (see the top panel of Figure 1). By numerical exercises (see Section 3.4 below), we
￿nd that the low stationary point never arises in equilibrium as it violates some feasibility conditions
(particularly, the non-negativity constraint of the production-use general capital). Thus, we will
focus exclusively on the high stationary point (point E in the top panel of Figure 1) around which
we now perform comparative statics.
12Changes in BP locus IT locus 1 ￿ ￿ pj s Aj z
decrease in ￿j
or increase in ￿
upward shift no change ￿ + + ￿ ￿
increase in   no change upward shift + ￿ ￿ + +
In response to a greater variety-speci￿c preference bias (due to a reduction in ￿0 or dj) or a
greater preference bias away from the manufactured good (due to an increase in ￿), the BP locus
shifts up whereas the IT locus remains unchanged. As a result, the demand for the manufactured
good in the local economy falls and the export share of the necessity increases. Due to a reduced
valuation of the manufactured good, the value of marginal product of general capital in production
decreases and the general capital stock is reallocated from manufacturing to research. However,
the value of technological advancements is also lower, which results in less R&D investment. On
balance, the steady-state level of technology is lower (the negative e⁄ect via z outweighs the positive
e⁄ect via s). Both lower technology and lower production-use general capital lead to a lower supply
of the manufactured good and hence less export this good to the local country. This supply e⁄ect
turns out to dominate the demand e⁄ect (because the local country lacks the option to produce
the manufactured good) and the equilibrium price of the manufactured good rises.
In response to more productive R&D, (represented by an increase in  ), the IT locus shifts up
whereas the BP locus remains unchanged. Thus, the level of technology is higher and the value
of technological advancements also rises, thereby increasing the R&D investment. By substitution,
the latter enables more general capital to be reallocated to production. As a result of both better
technology and more general capital input, the supply of the manufactured good by the source ￿rm
increases, which subsequently lowers the relative price of the manufactured good and encourages
the local economy to substitute the necessity by the manufactured good which leads to a higher
export share of the necessity.
3.1.2 The Outsourcing Regime

























































Note that (45) is a special case of (33) with no variety preference discount (as ￿i = 1).







= ￿ + ￿ (48)









































From (15) and (18), we have: v = ￿K and (1 ￿ ￿)piMi+￿K = (1￿￿)N, This latter expression,
































N [B1 ￿ B2 (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿1 (53)













￿ +￿ > 1. This BP locus has a similar shape
to that under the export regime, which is strictly increasing and strictly convex in
￿
1 ￿ ￿;1=pj￿

















Now, from (10) and imposing the steady state, we have:
Ai =  
1
1￿￿ (1 + z) (54)
14By applying (48), (54) and (54), (44) in the steady state can be rewritten as:
1
pi =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿) 
1
1￿￿












which is the IT locus under outsourcing. Unlike the exporting case, the IT locus for outsourcing
is downward-sloping and strictly convex in
￿
1 ￿ ￿;1=pj￿
space, with an asymptote, 1 ￿ ￿ =
￿￿
￿+￿.
The outsourcing equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2.

















1 + z =  
￿1














The comparative statics can be summarized as follows.
(OS) BP locus IT locus 1 ￿ ￿ pj K Aj z
increase in ￿ upward shift no change ￿ ￿ ￿ ? ?
increase in   no change upward shift + ￿ + + ?
15In response to a preference shift away from the manufactured good (due to an increase in ￿),
the BP locus shifts up whereas the IT locus remains unchanged. As a result, the demand for the
manufactured good in the local economy is lower, the export share of the necessity is lower, and the
relative price of the manufactured good falls. While the total stock of capital falls due to reduced
input into manufacturing the outsourced good (the capital input in the traditional sector remains
unchanged), the opposing forces cause ambiguous e⁄ects on Aj and z.
In response to more productive R&D (represented by an increase in  ), the IT locus shifts up
whereas the BP locus remains unchanged. Thus, local capital is reallocated from the production
of the necessity to the production of the outsourced manufactured good, causing the relative price
of the manufactured good to fall, the local consumption of the necessity to decrease and hence
the export share of the necessity increases. The total stock of capital increases as a result of
more induced demand to manufacture the outsourced good. The steady-state level of technology
is unambiguously higher in the absence of sectoral allocation e⁄ects in the source country (s = 1).
The e⁄ect on the investment in R&D, is ambiguous as higher productivity leads to more investment
in R&D via the substitution e⁄ect, but less investment due to the factor-saving e⁄ect of the better
technology.
3.2 Stage 2
We turn next to examining whether the representative consumer-producer in the local economy
would accept the outsourcing contract. This decision depends on the comparison of the respective
value function facing the representative local agent under each regime, which in the steady state














t ) + ln
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When the source country deals with a low-income country, the local economy￿ s export share
of the necessity is low and thus, the associated consumption share (￿EX) is high. Due to high
discounting (￿), the steady-state value of capital (K) is low. Thus, the direct consumption e⁄ect
via the ￿rst term of the value function dominates the indirect trade e⁄ect via the third term, making
the local agent more likely to import the manufactured good (Mj) than accepting an outsourcing
contract. Moreover, the less desirable the manufactured good is, the smaller the gap between the





This will be crucial for the next stage to which we now turn.
3.3 Stage 1
Finally, we determine whether the representative ￿rm in the source country would choose outsourc-
ing of the manufactured good over exporting. This is determined by comparing the respective value
function facing the representative source country agent under each regime, which in the steady state



































r ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿ + r)


































































17where REX(1￿￿) = K
h
￿+￿















state revenue gained by the source country ￿rm (both are an increasing in the local ￿rm￿ s export
share of the necessity, 1 ￿ ￿).




pj￿EX is low in the case when the source country is
dealing with a low-income country. In this case, the source country has less incentive to outsource.
Thus, the source country will choose to produce and export the manufacture good, so the low-
income local country imports the manufactured good.
Without further speci￿cation of the bargaining between the source and the local countries, we
can conclude:
Equilibrium outcome Conditions
Exporting (EX) WEX ￿ WOS > 0 and V EX ￿ V OS > 0




V EX ￿ V OS￿
< 0
3.4 Numerical Analysis
Since we cannot obtain an analytic solution for the equilibrium prices and allocations we turn to
numerical analysis. Our benchmark parametrization is to set both the depreciation rate and the
time discount rate at ￿ = ￿ = 5%, the variety-speci￿c preference discounting at ￿j = 0:8, and
the real interest rate at r = 10%. The output elasticities of capital are chosen to be ￿ = 0:3 and
￿ = 0:35, implying the production of the manufactured good is more capital intensive than the
production of the necessity. The technology parameters are set at   = 0:85 and ￿ = 0:9, the real
cost of R&D investment at q = 0:3, and the preference bias parameter at ￿ = 0:07.
Then, if the equilibrium results in exporting of the manufactured good, the relative price of
the manufactured good is pj = 3:63. The comparable ￿gure under the outsourcing regime with
￿ = 0:25 is pi = 3:30. Thus, under the benchmark case, the supply e⁄ect dominates the demand
e⁄ect.
The allocation under each regime are provided as follows.
Regime 1 ￿ ￿ s z A KM
K Nd M Nd
Y
EX 0:476 0:391 0:479 0:171 0% 0:839 0:144 52:4%
OS 0:462 1 0:195 0:235 11:4% 0:861 0:198 48:8%
18Thus, under the outsourcing regime, the technology in the source country is far better, which
generates a ￿trickle-down￿e⁄ect via revenue-sharing, enabling the local country to consume more
of both goods and to export more of its own products.
Next, we ask which regime arises in equilibrium? Using the benchmark parametrization, our
numerical results suggest outsourcing occurs if (but not only if) ￿ 2 (0:21143;0:33179). When
￿ (the fraction of output that goes to the host country under outsourcing) is too low, the local
country desires to import the manufactured good despite the fact that the source country prefers
to outsource. When ￿ is too high, the source country no longer o⁄ers outsourcing as an option but
simply produces and exports the manufactured good. Should the local country feature a relatively
high initial capital stock, there always exists a non-empty range of revenue-sharing schemes under
our benchmark parametrization such that outsourcing can arise in the steady state. Of course,
outsourcing may never arise if (i) local country capital is scarce (due to a su¢ ciently low initial
capital stock or an insu¢ cient accumulation of the capital stock as a result of a high time discount
rate), (ii) local country income is low (due to a su¢ ciently low capital return associated with low ￿),
or (iii) its consumers spend a major portion of their income on the necessity (due to a su¢ ciently
high value of ￿).
4 Conclusion
We consider a model that focuses on the export/outsource decision. For the source country the
advantage of outsourcing is that the host country partners have better information about local
preferences, so the outsourcing outcome involves ￿design for manufacturing￿to suit local prefer-
ences. The trade-o⁄ is that producing in the host country also means using the inferior technology
embodied in the local capital. The decision of whether to o⁄er an outsourcing contract weighs these
two e⁄ects against each other. For the host country, they accept the outsourcing contract if the
higher price they pay for the outsourced good is worth the bene￿t of consuming a manufactured
good closer to their ideal variety. These results suggest that as the low income country develops
they become a more attractive destination for outsourcing because the quality of their capital im-
proves and the local market is more lucrative. In addition, the developing low income country ￿nds
the outsourcing contract more attractive since their increased demand for the correct variety of
the manufactured good increases. This suggests that preference based outsourcing is more likely
to occur with higher income host countries.
19Appendix
We list some useful expressions for computing values.
1. (EX):
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